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I. INTRODUCTION
Earl Wilson was a hard-throwing starting pitcher for the Bos-
ton Red Sox in the sixties. Following a car accident, he sought the
assistance of Boston lawyer Bob Woolf. Shortly thereafter, in 1962,
Wilson threw a no-hitter and numerous commercial endorsements
and requests for appearances by Wilson poured in. Although Wil-
son could field his position, he found he needed help fielding the
requests for his services. Again he turned to Woolf."
"I told him I didn't know the first thing about it, but I'd try,"
2
said Woolf. "Back in 1962 I thought everybody was represented,
but nobody was . . . . Everybody said I was a pioneer, but it was
just being in the right place at the right time."3
Woolf is considered a pioneer. Although football legend Red
Grange used a theatrical agent to negotiate a contract in 1925 and
baseball great Babe Ruth consulted an agent, sports cartoonist
Christy Walsh, for financial advice during the stock market crash
of 1929,4 Woolf's dealings with Wilson are thought to be the birth
of sports law.5
1. Lawrence Shulruff, The Football Lawyers, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1985, 45, 46.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, CAREERS IN SPORTS LAW 9-10 (1990); see Craig Neff, Den
of Vipers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987 at 76.
5. Shulruff, supra note 1, at 46.
1
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Woolf is a lawyer, but negotiating a contract for an athlete
does not require a law degree. Among the earliest sports agents was
a Hollywood producer who represented Los Angeles Dodgers star
pitchers Don Drysdale and Sandy Koufax in their million-dollar
holdout in 1965.'
There is very little law that applies strictly to sports, yet
sports law is a legal biosphere, developing its own answers to con-
tract law problems.' Just as an opera singer cannot be compelled
to perform under a contract," specific performance is also unavaila-
ble to a sports club trying to remedy an athlete's refusal to per-
form under an existing contract while demanding a new, richer
contract." In response to this apparent inequity, the biosphere has
prescribed such things as shorter-term contracts, salaries tied to
the market and incentive bonuses.
It is the agent who has his hand on the biosphere's thermostat.
The seventies saw an agent boom,"0 accelerating the .evolution of
techniques used to negotiate athletes' contracts. This paper will
chronicle that evolution.
For the sake of perspective, bear this in mind: it has been sug-
gested that if Babe Ruth played today, his agent could get Ruth
the first billion-dollar contract in sports."
II. NEGOTIATION DEVICES
The devices agents employ in negotiating athletes' contracts
reflect a variety of influences. Sports agent Howard Slusher, for
example, is often identified as the man most responsible for put-
ting "renegotiation" into the seventies sports page headlines.12 He
has the reputation of being "the most controversial agent in
sports."'3 While growing up in New York City, Slusher, a non-
Catholic, wanted to play basketball at a Catholic church." "The
6. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 4, at 10.
7. See id. at 1.
8. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
9. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.5 (2d ed. 1990).
10. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 239 (1990) [hereinafter YASSER].
11. Leigh Montville, It's Back to the Bambino, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 1989, at
100. The article posits a fantasy wherein the agent, using time travel, offers Ruth to a pre-
sent-day team. The billion-dollar deal is based on Ruth pitching and playing right field
between starts. Id.
12. See, e.g., Peter Richmond, Sport Interview: Howard
Slusher, SPORT, Feb. 1983, at 15; Dave Nightingale, Slusher Adds
New Twist to 'Renegotiation', THE SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 13, 1982, at 13.
13. Peter Richmond, supra note 12, at 15.
14. Id. at 21.
[Vol. 10:165
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coach said that if I went to church, I could play. I learned to nego-
tiate that very day," Slusher recalled.
15
Slusher's approach to negotiation reflects a philosophical bent:
"The law is an actual, functional arena in which to promulgate the
alteration of a society and how you see society being benefitted
. iT]he game has served a wrong for too long." 16
Attorney Jeff Irwin negotiates contracts for athletes including
football player Aundray Bruce. His comments regarding the
changes in negotiation practice since he started in 1982 present a
down-to-earth approach: "You still have, basically, a product that
you're selling and there's a market value for that product and you
just try to get the maximum value for it.""8
A. Players' Strategies
1. The Holdout
Eldon Auker, a major league pitcher in the thirties and for-
ties,19 lamented:
We had no assurance of anything. They could release us anytime
they wanted to and we didn't have much to say about it. We just
signed a four-page contract and everybody signed it. It didn't
make any difference who you were, you signed it. And they
could trade you, they could do anything to you until you were in
the major leagues ten years. You were just like an automobile.
They'd get rid of you anytime they wanted to get a new one.
2 0
What little clout the players of Auker's era had came from the
holdout. A holdout occurs when a player refuses to play or practice
until he comes to an agreement with his team. It is, more or less,
an individual strike.
The holdout used to be common during baseball's spring
training period.21 Babe Ruth, in fact, often held out.2 2 Veteran
sports writer Milton Richman found Ruth's holdouts to be a rite of
spring: "Every time I'd see the annual headline saying 'Ruth Holds
15. Id.
16. Richmond, supra note 12, at 20.
17. Telephone Interview with Jeff Irwin, Sports Agent (Apr. 8, 1992).
18. Id.
19. Stan Isaacs, How About That? Mel Wasn't There, NEWSDAY, July 16, 1991, at 121;
Some Historic Rotations, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 25, 1986, at 17.
20. When It Was a Game (HBO television cablecast, Apr. 5, 1992).
21. Milton Richman, Today's Sport Parade, UPI, Feb. 27, 1984, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
22. Id.
3
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Out,' I'd automatically know winter was all over and spring was
here."23
Spring holdouts gave fans something to talk about. Richman
recalled, "The late [general manager] Frank Lane realized the pub-
licity value in wrangling over money with a player . . . so he and
[player] Minnie Minoso contrived a 'feud' over salary one year
with the White Sox when, in fact, Minoso already had agreed to a
figure and there was no difference between them whatsoever."2
Holdouts are less common today, as sports law has responded
with the negotiation of new contracts before current, multi-year
contracts expire, leading many players to sign during their playing
seasons. 25 It is not common for players today to miss games be-
cause of holdouts, as did NBA rookie Jim Jackson, who sat out the
Dallas Mavericks' first fifty-four games of the 1992-93 season.2"
Typically, holdouts end before the start of the regular season. For
example, rookie football professional Troy Vincent held out during
the Miami Dolphins' training camp, but signed before the Dol-
phins' last pre-season game in 1992.7 However, lawyer Richard
Woods, who broke in as a sports agent in a big way in 1986 by
representing two-sport star Bo Jackson, maintains that the holdout
is still potent: 8 "The holdout is still the ultimate threat, particu-
larly when you have a good player. If the player holds out, that's




Football star Bobby Humphrey held out from the Denver
Broncos for ninety-seven days in 1991. He was in the middle of a
four-year contract and demanded renegotiation. Bronco manage-
ment refused, and Humphrey returned to play in only four games




26. Mitch Lawrence, Big News in Big D; NBA Rookie Jim Jackson Sparks Lowly
Mavericks After Ending Long Holdout, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1993, at C6.
27. Peter May, Despite an Upset Stomach, Dolphins Rookie Cornerback Troy Vin-
cent Made the Chargers Sick Last Sunday When he Came up With a Pair of Intercep-
tions. It Was a Stirring Example of a ... Gutsy Effort, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1993, at
37.
28. Telephone Interview with Richard Woods, Sports Agent (Apr. 7, 1992).
29. Id.
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player threatens to hold out unless his current contract is
changed." No negotiation device stirs up as much controversy as
the debate over the ethics of such a demand.
Bruce Allen, an agent and former general manager in the
United States Football League,3 2 contended, "Both teams and ath-
letes must be able to renegotiate to correct injustices in prior nego-
tiations." ' Howard Slusher added, "[O]ne of the things the athlete
contracts to do is to breach. Inherent in the contract is that very
possibility." '34 Slusher pointed out, though, "I have never renegoti-
ated a contract that I personally have negotiated."3 5
On the other side of the debate is Bob Woolf, who said, "I've
never blackmailed a club into renegotiating. That's what it is, what
else could it be called? '3' The late sports scholar and tennis great
Arthur Ashe also opposed renegotiation. In 1979, Ashe wrote:
"Quite a few pro athletes these days erroneously equate their high
salaries with a unilateral right to renegotiate their contracts when-
ever they feel their compensation is not commensurate with their
talents.
37
Most general managers are likely to agree with their anony-
mous colleague, quoted by sports writer Dave Nightingale: "If you
examine it closely, you will see that 'renegotiate' is just a long
spelling of the word 'renege.' I can't renege on a contract with one
of my athletes. Why should the athlete be able to do it to me?
'38
Regardless of its ethics, renegotiation is a device that has
served some opportunistic athletes.3 9 Even if an athlete's agent es-
chews renegotiation, the athlete has alternative methods. For ex-
ample, in 1979, basketball star Marques Johnson asked attorney
Donald Dell to renegotiate his contract with the Milwaukee Bucks.
When Dell refused, Johnson switched agents.4 °
Renegotiation was common during the seventies. Former
31. See Alex M. Johnson, The Argument for Self-Help Specific Performance: Oppor-
tunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts, 22 CONN. L. REV. 61 (1989).
32. Bruce Allen, Shorter-term Deals Offer Best Solution, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1991,
at 19C.
33. Id.
34. Richmond, supra note 12, at 17.
35. Id. at 15.
36. Slusher: Love Him or Loathe Him, SPORT, Feb. 1983, at 18.
37. Arthur Ashe, Contracts Made To Be Honored; "Renegotiators" Hurt Everybody,
WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1979, at F4.
38. Dave Nightingale, Slusher Adds New Twist to "Renegotiation", THE SPORTING
NEWS, Feb. 13, 1982, at 13.
39. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 62.
40. Ashe, supra note 37, at F4.
5
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sports executive Bob Briner recalled:
[Olne of the top young players in the [American Basketball As-
sociation] ...had a bonus clause that called for him to get a
new $10,000 car. After one year of his old contract he phoned
the general manager and said he had to renegotiate. When he
got to the office he explained that the car provision had to be
liberalized. "You just can't get a decent car for $10,000," he
said.'
In the same decade, red-headed Howard Slusher earned the
nickname "Agent Orange" as a result of deals he negotiated for
athletes including Gus Williams."2 Slusher advised Williams to
holdout the entire 1980-81 basketball season. On the issue of rene-
gotiation, Slusher stated his respect for owners who "don't run to
the newspaper to negotiate to the press."43
Agent Larry Fleisher agrees that renegotiation should be done
privately. "I just finished renegotiating a contract for one of the
league's better players,""" said Fleisher in 1982, "but the club
didn't announce it was done and I'm certainly not going to an-
nounce that I did it.'
65
Presently, renegotiation is not so common as it was in the sev-
enties. Attorney Richard Thomas, who has represented the likes of
football star Jack Lambert, reasoned that the decline is a result of
current higher salaries,46 so negotiations are more deliberate, mak-
ing it a greater undertaking to disturb that which has been agreed
upon."'
In 1979, Arthur Ashe predicted that the breaking of contracts
could result in "more short-term contracts to make it easier to
dump a player"4 Shorter-term contracts are now more common, at
least in football. Pittsburgh Steelers attorney Arthur Rooney I
claims that the shorter-term contracts are directly responsible for
the decline in renegotiation in that sport."9 The source of the re-
41. Bob Briner, Making Sport of Us All, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 10, 1973, at 38.
42. Richmond, supra note 12, at 15; David Israel, Sit Up and Take Notice, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 18, 1982, at 104.
43. Richmond, supra note 12, at 18.
44. Nightingale, supra note 38, at 14.
45. Id.
46. Thomas is concerned that players' salaries are escalating unreasonably: "That's
not a very good point of view if you represent players, but I think it is a consuming kind of
an escalation. It's going to destroy the . . . industry." Telephone Interview with Richard
Thomas, Sports Agent (Apr. 15, 1992).
47. Id.
48. Ashe, supra note 37, at F4.
49. Telephone interview with Arthur Rooney II, Attorney for the Pittsburgh Steelers
[Vol. 10:165
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quests for shorter-term contracts does not follow Ashe's forecast.50
According to Rooney: "The players and the agents are seeking
shorter-term contracts at this point, and succeeding, I would say
for the most part . . . Nowadays, we're down to most players
starting off wanting a one-year contract and the team is trying to
get two or three years."51 Rooney characterized the change as a
major shift in negotiation strategy.
52
Renegotiation demands are also down in basketball; however,
for different reasons. Phoenix Suns president Jerry Colangelo has
negotiated every player contract since that National Basketball As-
sociation team came into existence in 1968.11 He believes the
NBA's salary cap5 4 has checked demands for renegotiation. He
stated: "If a team is over the cap, they're restricted from any rene-
gotiation. The agents knowing that . . . have no position to come
in and demand anything because they know it's not . . . allowa-
ble."55 Football players' agents can be expected to face a similar
obstacle in the NFL's new salary cap.56
There is a way for superstar basketball players' agents to get
around the obstacle of the salary cap. The allowable solution is a
contract extension with "balloon" payments to be made to the ath-
lete in the added years.57 Boston Celtic legend Larry Bird benefit-
ted from this technique. For the 1991-92 season, he collected $7.1
million, $4.9 million of which was a deferred bonus.5 '
(Apr. 16, 1992).
50. See Ashe, supra note 37, at F4.
51. Rooney, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. Telephone Interview with Jerry Colangelo, President, Phoenix Suns (Apr. 17,
1992).
54. The salary cap is part of the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA
and the National Basketball Players Association. It went int.o effect in the 1986-1987 season,
limiting team salary payments to
the greater of either (a) a "fixed sum" of $4.5 million, or (b) 53 percent of the
total NBA gross revenues divided by the twenty-three teams in the league. The
minimum salary a team may pay its players has been determined by the "fixed
sum" allocated for that particular season.
GARY UBERSTINE, LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 7.06, at 7-19 (1991).
55. Colangelo, supra note 53.
56. In their new labor contract, NFL players and owners agreed to a salary cap to be
triggered if player salaries reach sixty-seven percent of designated gross revenues. Arnie
Stapleton, NFL, Players Come to Terms, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 7, 1993, at D1.
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3. Leverage
a. Comparative Salaries
In 1977, NFL player's salaries were based on the player's value
to his team. However, since 1989, salaries have been determined by
comparing players.59
In 1989, attorney Leigh Steinberg used the following compara-
tive-salary tale in negotiations with owner Victor Kiam over
quarterback Tony Eason's New England Patriots contract:60
Suppose you had a ditchdigger who was one of the best
ditchdiggers there is, and through no fault of his own he was
covered by a landslide of dirt. He was disabled for two years,
then came back ready and healthy to work. He should make
what his ditchdigger peers make."
Kiam bit. Eason, who had not played much in the previous two
seasons, signed a two-year, $2.35 million contract.2
In 1984, relief pitcher Willie Hernandez was a baseball rarity
when he represented himself in contract negotiations.6 3 Hernandez
proved to be well-schooled in negotiating. He threatened to de-
mand a trade unless the Detroit Tigers gave him a contract exten-
sion that would put him on a salary level with comparably talented
relievers such as Goose Gossage. Gossage had a five-year, $6.25
million contract.
6 4
Comparative salaries can present a problem for baseball teams
with superstars. One sports writer demonstrated the problem when
he pondered the demands of Jos6 Canseco and Roger Clemons: "If
[their teams] can sign [them], the payroll is blown apart and every
other player wants more. In the current market, it is no stretch to
think Clemons [or Canseco] might be worth $20-$25 million,
higher than most teams' payrolls.
'65
Comparative salaries can cause other problems. In basketball,
Donald Dell was in a dilemma when he negotiated Marques John-
son's rookie contract:
59. Gordon Forbes, End Results: White Highest-paid Defensive Lineman, USA To-
DAY, Aug. 23, 1989, at 10C.
60. He's Dialing for Dollars, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 7, 1989, at 18.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Murray Chass, Hernandez Files for Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1984, at B8,
col. 4.
64. Id.
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[W]e were fairly certain he would be drafted number three by
the Milwaukee Bucks, who that year also held the number-one
draft choice. That represented a problem for us because every-
one knew that Indiana all-American Kent Benson would be
drafted number one that year. Why was that a problem? Be-
cause Benson's agent wasn't very experienced and also had for-
merly worked for the Bucks organization, we were afraid that
Benson was going to end up with a low contract. If they drafted
Marques, they would expect him to accept an even lesser con-
tract at the number three position in the NBA draft.6
Dell solved the problem by warning Bucks owner Jim Fitzger-
ald, before the draft, that Johnson was going to cost more than
Benson. Fitzgerald ultimately agreed to Dell's demand.
b. Other Offers
One of the best ways to gain leverage in negotiations is for the
athlete to have an offer from another team. Other offers, however,
are not always readily available. In baseball, other offers were vir-
tually unavailable until 1975, when pitchers Andy Messersmith
and Dave McNally challenged the system, which automatically re-
newed a player's contract even if the parties executed no new writ-
ing. An arbitrator struck down the system and declared Messer-
smith and McNally to be free agents thereby making free agency
available to other baseball players.6 8 Presently, other offers are
common. In 1992, the California Angels made an offer to All-Star
Bobby Bonilla. Dennis Gilbert, Bonilla's agent, showed the offer to
the New York Mets. The Mets bettered the Angels' offer and
signed Bonilla.6 e
The NBA's first right of refusal rule restricts a player's free-
dom to accept an offer from another team. The rule was agreed
upon by the team owners and the player's union after the 1975
case of Robertson v. National Basketball Association0 which held
the NBA to be in violation of antitrust law. 1 Under the rule, a
player who has been in the league for at least five years becomes a
66. DONALD DELL, MINDING OTHER PEOPLE'S BUSINESS 139-163 (1988), reprinted in
YASSER, supra note 10, at 298.
67. Id. at 298-9.
68. Kevin A. Rings, Note, Baseball Free Agency And Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsI. RESOL. 243, 250 (1987).
69. Murray Chass, Bidding in the Dark Amid the Free Agent Market, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1992, at sec. 8, p. 6, col. 1 [hereinafter Chass, Bidding in the Dark].
70. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
71. Id.
9
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free agent upon the expiration of his contract. However, the
player's current team then has a right to match the best offer the
player receives from another team. 2
Jerry Colangelo said the first right of refusal has changed
management strategy considerably.7 3 "Teams have had to manage
player contracts much more closely, 74 said Colangelo. "You have
to operate within the rules and regulations of the [salary] cap
much more closely. On one hand, it's much less flexibility. On the
other hand, it promotes a much better fiduciary responsibility on
the part of management."7"
League restrictions on offers to players (such as first right of
refusal and the draft) do not apply to teams that are not members
of that league. Teams from rival leagues have enhanced athletes'
leverage by offering them competitive contracts. For that reason,
Gary Davidson would have to be considered the professional team
player's best friend. As a key organizer of the ABA, the World
Hockey Association, and the World Football League, Davidson lit-
erally wrote the book on rival leagues. 76 Although all three are de-
funct, each had a major impact on players' contracts.
"New leagues are the greatest things that could happen to
sports, 77 stated agent Al Ross flatly. "In a competitive situation,
the salary offers rise to their highest point. The player commands
the most his talent rates.
'78
Football players gained leverage from rival-league offers even
before agents came on the scene. In 1959, Heisman Trophy winner
Billy Cannon played an offer from the NFL's Los Angeles Rams
against an offer from the Houston Oilers of the upstart American
Football League.7 9 From that moment, the NFL-AFL talent war
escalated, culminating with Joe Namath's $400,000 contract with
the AFL New York Jets. The Namath deal is credited with bring-
ing about the merger of the two leagues in 1969.80
72. Timothy W. Smith, N.F.L. Is Dusting Off Its Shield For Another Free Agency
Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at sec. 8, p. 4, col. 1.
73. Colangelo, supra note 53.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See GARY DAVIDSON WITH BILL LIBBY, BREAKING THE GAME WIDE OPEN (1974)
[hereinafter DAVIDSON].
77. Id. at 98.
78. Id. at 99.
79. Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp 717, 719-20 (S.D. Cal.
1960).
80. Festive Weekend for 5 Inductees, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1985, at 5 (Sports); Namath
Recalls Showman Werblin, CHI. TrI., Nov. 24, 1991, at 3 (Sports).
[Vol. 10:165
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In the eighties, the United States Football League signed
Heisman Trophy winner Doug Flutie, among others, and offered
players a competitive alternative.81 The league went under after
winning but $3 in treble damages in an antitrust suit against the
NFL.8 2 The USFL's death spelled a decrease in leverage for foot-
ball players and an immediate impact on salaries. Between 1984,
the last year the USFL courted top college players, and 1986, sala-
ries dropped twenty percent, according to the NFL Players
Association.8
Leigh Steinberg feels that the USFL's absence has put him in
a much worse position when negotiating NFL contracts:
Although the Canadian Football League (CFL) offers an athlete
another playing option, the CFL is frequently an unsatisfactory
alternative since it restricts the number of U.S. players that a
team can sign, its pay structure is generally uncompetitive with
the NFL's scale, and the Canadian income tax laws subject U.S.
players to certain adverse tax consequences. As a result, many
players are left with take-it-or-leave-it proposals from their NFL
teams. 4
Despite the disadvantages of the CFL, the group of agents known
as "Team Rocket" found it to be useful. "Team Rocket" negoti-
ated Notre Dame speedster Raghib "Rocket" Ismail's $18-26 mil-
lion contract with the Toronto Argonauts. By signing with the Ar-
gonauts, Ismail spurned the Dallas Cowboys, who held his NFL
rights8 5
Agent David Fishof orchestrated an innovative use of the CFL
as leverage. In 1979, Fishof's client Vince Ferragamo earned
$52,000 from the Los Angeles Rams. 6 Fishof turned to Nelson
Skalbania, then the new owner of the CFL's Montreal Alouettes.
Skalbania came up with a $2 million deal for Ferragamo, who
played just one season in Canada before Skalbania's financial woes
forced him to let Ferragamo out of his contract.8 7 Fishof brought
Ferragamo back to the Rams, negotiating a five-year contract
81. Shulruff, supra note 1, at 49.
82. See United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335(2d Cir. 1988).
83. Joel Sherman, UPI, Aug. 4, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
84. Leigh W. Steinberg, Negotiating Contracts in the National Football League, C627
ALI-ABA 617, June 6, 1991, at 5.
85. Rick Matsumoto, $18 MILLION ROCKET: Argos Expect Notre Dame Speedster
to Increase Gates by 17,000, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 22, 1991, at Cl.
86. DAVID FISHOF & EUGENE SHAPIRO, PUTTING IT ON THE LINE 77 (1983).
87. Id. at 95-100.
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starting at $300,000 per year, increasing to $500,000 per year."8
The latest "rival" football league turned out not to be a rival
at all, as NFL veteran Mike Rozier found out. In 1991, he ap-
proached the Birmingham Fire of the World League of American
Football only to be told that the WLAF would not accept NFL
players. The WLAF was affiliated with the NFL and decided, in
Rozier's case, to respect residual rights held by the NFL's Atlanta
Falcons.""
WLAF president Mike Lynn's decision brought a threatening
response from Rozier's agent Art Wilkinson: "What's his basis?
He'll have to tell me . . .or maybe tell a judge."9 ° The WLAF did
not operate in 1993 but plans to return for a 1994 season.'
Jerry Colangelo remembered the ABA as "the beginning of a
whole different twist to negotiations in basketball."92 Case law tells
the story of the fierce fighting between the NBA and the ABA for
players,93 fighting that gave the players unprecedented leverage.
The ABA is dead, but its effect is still felt in basketball. The
Robertson suit was the result of the players' anticipation of a de-
crease in bargaining power upon the ABA's death.94 Also, Euro-
pean basketball shows signs of affecting NBA player negotiations
in a fashion similar to the ABA. Increasingly, newspapers are
printing reports such as: "The Denver Nuggets signed forward An-
dre Moore of Loyola. Moore had reportedly been set to sign a con-
tract to play in Europe.''"
"European basketball has definitely become a viable alterna-
tive for many players, ' noted Colangelo. "Five to ten years ago,
European basketball did not present itself as a big-time opportu-
nity financially . . . . [Today] many American players are using
that [European basketball] in leverage regarding negotiations. '" 91
88. Id. at 102.
89. See Football, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1991, at D2.
90. Id.
91. Richard Wetherell, US Anti-monopoly Ruling Puts Europe on Hold, THE TIMRS
(LONDON), Sept. 19, 1992, Sport sec.
92. Colangelo, supra note 53.
93. See, e.g., Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th
Cir. 1969) (dispute between the ABA Washington team and NBA San Francisco team over
the services of Rick Barry); Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.Y.
1969) (dispute between ABA Minnesota team and NBA St. Louis team over services of Lou
Hudson); Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972) (dispute between
ABA Carolina team and NBA Philadelphia team over services of Billy Cunningham).
94. See 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
95. Briefs, CIH. TRB., Oct. 15, 1987, at 2 (Sports).
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When top prospects Danny Ferry and Brian Shaw chose Ital-
ian teams over the NBA in 1989, one sports writer surmised, they
"left players dreaming of big contracts and agents dreaming of the
ultimate bargaining tool." 98 Whether that dream will come true re-
mains to be seen.
Even major league baseball, which encounters far fewer chal-
lenges from rival leagues than the NFL or NBA, can be affected by
this form of leverage. In 1989, number one draft pick Ben McDon-
ald was offered $2 million by a proposed new league, backed by
investor Donald Trump, agent Dick Moss and others.99 McDon-
ald's agent Scott Boras parlayed the offer into a $1.1 million deal
with the Baltimore Orioles.100 The proposed new league never
hatched.
A new variation on offers from rival leagues involves offers
from other sports. However, only a few athletes can take advantage
of it. It is an approach played to its full effect by Bo Jackson. Jack-
son started his professional career with the Kansas City Royals,
then joined the NFL's Los Angeles Raiders during baseball's off-
season. The two-sport combination increased Jackson's bargaining
leverage in both sports." 1
Earlier, John Elway used the tactic to beat the restrictions of
the NFL draft. Elway was drafted by the Baltimore Colts. He did
not want to play for the Colts, so he threatened to play baseball for
the New York Yankees. Elway had already played in the Yankees'
minor league system. The threat worked, and the Colts traded
Elway's rights to the Denver Broncos, who signed him to a five-
year, $1 million-per-year contract. Before Elway, the NFL's high-
est-paid quarterback had been veteran Archie Manning, whose an-
nual salary was $600,000. °2
Deion Sanders played football for the Atlanta Falcons and
baseball for the Atlanta Braves when the seasons for those sports
overlapped in 1991 and 1992. The result was big money from a
collateral source: Nike, the athletic shoe company, paid Sanders $1
million per year for playing both sports at the same time of year.103
98. Jackie MacMullan, A Warming or Warning? Players, Clubs Increasingly Find
Seas Choppy Between Here and Europe, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1990, at 55.
99. Richard Justice, McDonald Would Accept An Offer From Orioles; For $400,000
More He'd Reject New League, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1989, at D1.
100. Tim Kurkjian, Power Hitter, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 12, 1991, at 59.
101. Telephone Interview with Denny Thum, Assistant General Manager, Kansas City
Chiefs (Apr. 8, 1992).
102. Shulruff, supra note 1, at 49.
103. Dave Nightingale, Sanders Retires the Braves' Ire, THE SPORTING NEWS, Oct. 19,
1992, at p. 11.
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c. Free Agency
Whenever free agency looms for a valuable athlete, his agent
commands a potent tool. Free agency allows an athlete to enjoy
increased leverage even when he does not want to change teams as
the threat of an athlete being free to negotiate with any team can
force the athlete's current team to give the athlete a new, richer
contract."0 4
Free agency's impact is best illustrated by the numbers:
Before baseball's 1977 adoption of free agency, an average major
leaguer earned about $52,000 per year. Four years later, the aver-
age salary was $130,000. 'O5 The NFL's lack of free agency is a fun-
damental reason why that league's average salary in 1991 ($203,000
per year) was less than half that of major league baseball
($412,500) and the NBA ($500,000). '0'
"Free agency made the pendulum swing whereby it was a true
negotiation,"' 0 7 said agent Gary Walker, who negotiated Reggie
Jackson's contracts during Jackson's stellar baseball career. 08
"Before, when they couldn't go anyplace, it wasn't really a level
playing field."' 09 Expect similar results for football players with
the coming of free agency to the NFL."10
d. College Ball
While the compensation differential is great,"1 ' some athletes
who have not signed their first professional contracts can use col-
lege for leverage. Some top pitching prospects have recently found
the threat of playing college baseball to be compelling."'
104. UBERSTINE, supra note 54 at § 7.07[2], at 7-21 (1991).
105. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 102 (1982).
106. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 2.
107. Telephone Interview with Gary Walker, Sports Agent (Apr. 7, 1992).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. In their new labor contract, NFL players and owners agreed to free agency for
players with expired contracts and at least five years service in the league. The required
years of service drops to four if player salaries reach sixty-seven percent of designated gross
revenues. Stapleton, supra note 56, at D1.
111. Colleges are limited to awarding only scholarships to athletes. See Yasser, supra
note 10, at 1.
112. Using college baseball for leverage is really a double-barreled tactic. It presents
professional teams with the possibility that the athlete will (1) go to college now, and (2) be
drafted by another team later. Professional baseball teams retain rights to players they draft
for only one year.
A change may be on the horizon, though: "The players association has filed a grievance
against the so-called Brien Taylor Rule, which would allow clubs to retain draft rights until
one year after that player's class graduates college." Notes, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 18, 1992,
[Vol. 10:165
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Scott Boras plays the negotiation game as well as his client,
Sandy Alomar Jr., throws out would-be base stealers. 13 In 1990,
Boras parlayed high school righthander Todd Van Poppel's
staunch desire to play for the University of Texas into a $1.2 mil-
lion contract with the Oakland Athletics.'
14
The University of Texas is a college baseball power. But the
school does not have to be prominent to provide leverage for the
agent. In 1991, the mother of high school pitching marvel Brien
Taylor insisted her son would attend Louisburg College in North
Carolina unless he got the right money. Boras used Bettie Taylor's
stand to get Brien a $1.55 million deal with the New York
Yankees." 5
NBA and NFL rules allow collegians who have not completed
four years of college to declare themselves draftable."' Doing so
costs the athlete any intercollegiate eligibility he has left,"' but
the move often results in increased leverage. The reason, according
to Richard Woods, is "because you've had some extraordinary tal-
ents come out early and they commanded higher salaries, then that
raised everyone else's salary around them."" 8
e. Arbitration
Baseball is unique among American professional team sports
in that it allows certain players to submit their salary disputes to
arbitration." '1 Players who can take advantage of the arrangement
generally have at least three years of major league experience, but
at C3, col. 5.
113. Alomar is the catcher for the Cleveland Indians.
114. Kurkjian, supra note 100, at 59.
115. Id.; Jon Heyman, Boss Pays Way, Gets 2 Cents In; Banished George Holds Court
in Stands, NEWSDAY, March 23, 1992, at 94.
116. Colangelo, supra note 53; See Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.
Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
117. 'NCAA Bylaw 12.2.4.2. The rule is:
DRAFT LIST. An individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the
individual asks to be placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a pro-
fessional league in that sport, even though:
(a) The individual asks that his or her name be withdrawn from the draft list
prior to the actual draft,
(b) The individual's name remains on the list but he or she is not drafted, or
(c) The individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with any profes-
sional athletics team.
id.
118. Woods, supra note 28.
119. YASSER, supra note 10, at 321.
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less than six.12 Arbitration has turned out to be player-favorable
because players taking advantage of it usually get big raises. '21 If
the end of a player's contract is approaching, and he is eligible for
arbitration, he has a good bargaining tool for negotiating a new
contract.
Imminent arbitration gave pitcher Orel Hershiser the leverage
he needed to get a $7.9 million contract with the Los Angeles
Dodgers in 1989. The parties were in the room where the arbitrator
was to have heard their arguments, when a settlement was
reached.2 2
"We were on the verge of having a hearing," '23 explained play-
ers union official Eugene Orza. "There's always an effort made
before a hearing to reach a settlement. That's what happened
"124
Often, an arbitrator would welcome a settlement. For instance,
midway through infielder Tim Teufel's 1989 arbitration hearing
with the New York Mets, arbitrator Richard Bloch announced,
"I've never done this before, "12' and stopped the proceedings.
Bloch took both sides into an adjacent room and told them, "It
seems to me you guys really can settle this thing, so why don't you
try to settle it now? ' 126 Bloch then left Mets' negotiator Joe McIl-
vaine and Tony' Attanasio, Teufel's agent, to negotiate. 127 McI-
vaine and Attanasio made some progress before a stalemate re-
quired Bloch's return for a decision.
12
f. Publicity Value
An athlete who takes advantage of the publicity value of his
signing may gain increased leverage while the team makes head-
lines. Joe Namath's $400,000 contract in 1965 was less the result of
agent hardball than of New York Jets' owner Sonny Werblin's de-
sire to pay a record price for the publicity value.
129
120. Id. at 322.
121. Class lecture by Professor Alfred Mathewson, University of New Mexico School
of Law Sports Law Class (Mar. 23, 1992).
122. Richard Justice, Hershiser to Get $7.9 Million for Three Seasons; Could Be First
$3 Million-a-Year Player, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1989,at Fl.
123. Id.
124. Id.





129. Pete Axthelm, The Men Behind The Men Who Make Money In Sports, VOGUE,
[Vol. 10:165
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Nearly two decades later, Franco Harris may have overesti-
mated his publicity value to the Pittsburgh Steelers. Harris was
chasing the NFL's all-time rushing record. He thought the Steelers
would see his run at the record as a way to get a great deal of ink
and air time. Although Harris was a thirteen-year veteran, he
sought a raise and a two-year deal. 130 To Harris's surprise, the
Steelers waived him. Harris was not finished with football, though,





a. Length of Contract
Generally, if a player is early in his career and his skills are
improving, he is likely to want a shorter contract than if he is in
his prime, or if his skills are diminishing. That is so his salary can
rise commensurate with his ability. Because of the high chance of
injury in football, though, NFL contracts are usually limited to one
year to allow severability."32
The case of Sample v. Gotham Football Club, Inc., 33 is a good
example. Johnny Sample signed a series of three one-year con- -
tracts with the New York Jets covering the years 1968, 1969 and
1970." Sample suffered an injury before the 1969 season, and the
Jets terminated his contracts for 1969 and 1970. Sample tried to
get paid for those two seasons, under the theory that the three
one-year contracts really constituted one three-year contract.'35
The court found that the intent of the parties, which was control-
ling, was for the contracts to be separate.
13
1
In baseball and basketball, players can negotiate the length of
their contracts so that they expire when the players are eligible to
take advantage of free agency or arbitration. Previously, free
agency did not exist in the NFL in the way it did in baseball and
basketball, therefore football players were much more restricted
from switching teams. That, however, has changed, and anticipa-
May 1971, at 193.
130. UPI, July 22, 1984 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
131. Harris Fulfills a Rush Order, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1984, at sec. D, p. 26, col. 1.
132. YASSER, supra note 10, at 314.
133. 59 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
134. Id. at 162.
135. Id. at 164.
136. Id. at 165. But cf. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d
Cir. 1979) (parties intended three one-year instruments to function as one three-year
contract).
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tion of the change affected contract negotiation strategy. In 1991,
the NFL Players Association began encouraging players to avoid
contracts covering 1993 or later. The reason for that advice was




Over the twelve years that Denny Thum has been negotiating
contracts for the Kansas City Chiefs, one thing has remained con-
stant:"s' "[The agents] are all still trying to negotiate guaranteed
contracts, which, in our business, there are very few of, unlike
baseball and basketball."'
139
One of those agents is Leigh Steinberg. "[G]uarantees are al-
ways an absolute goal of a negotiation, ' ' "0 stated Steinberg. "Al-
though a function of leverage, skill guarantees (where a player is
paid even if he is cut for lack of skill) are extremely difficult to
obtain due to the feeling of NFL teams that such agreements are
detrimental to the game.''
An injury guarantee may be within reach "since the risk of
injury can be insured by either side." 2 However, some career end-
ing injuries to football superstars such as Joe Theisman, Billy Sims
and Lee Roy Selmon have greatly driven up premiums on injury
disability policies. NFL teams are now more reluctant to fully in-
sure players. Therefore, in negotiations for injury guarantees, "the
issue is essentially who pays the disability policy premium.'" s
c. No-Cut and No-Trade Clauses
Similar to guarantees are no-cut and no-trade clauses, which
can be negotiated into the athlete's contract if he has enough lev-
137. Frank Litzky, Agent Johnson Reports for Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, sec.
B, p. 12, col. 1. Free agency came into existence in the NFL in March, 1993. Players with
expired contracts and at least five years experience may declare free agency. If the NFL
adopts a salary cap in 1994 or later, the experience requirement will drop to four years.
Each team may designate one "franchise player," who cannot become a free agent, and two
"transition players" in 1993 and one in 1994. Transition players may be retained by their
teams if they are paid the average salary of the ten best-paid players at the transition play-
ers' positions. Bob Glauber, What Does It All Mean?, NEWSDAY, Feb. 28, 1993, at 11.
138. Thum, supra note 101.
139. Id.
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erage.'" There are at least three types of no-cut clauses. The first,
illustrated in Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham,145 prevents a player
from being cut from a team for lack of skill. The team probably
would be allowed to cut the player for bad physical or mental con-
dition. The standard NFL no-cut is the second type. It is much
like the Cunningham no-cut, except it is more specific in requiring
the player to maintain excellent physical condition.14 The third
type of no-cut, and the best from a player's viewpoint, uses lan-
guage such as "salary payable to employee in any event. ' 147 In
these cases even if a player's contract includes a no-cut clause, the
team can still suspend the player for disciplinary reasons, and re-
lease the player for lack of a good faith effort." 8
Standard player contracts allow assignability by the team, so a
player who is well-settled in a city may want to be protected
against a trade." 9 Such a player's agent may negotiate for a no-
trade or limited-trade clause. A no-trade clause only allows the
player to be traded if the player approves. A limited-trade clause
allows the player to submit a list of teams to which he would be
willing to be traded. For either type of clause to be won in negotia-
tions requires sufficient bargaining power. Usually the athlete must
give up something from another part of the contract.
15
1
d. Salary Tied to That of Peers
The latest, state-of-the-art, player-favorable term for star ath-
letes allows the player's salary to rise with the market. Leigh
Steinberg used the technique with Warren Moon. Moon's 1989
contract with the Houston Oilers contained a clause that required
Moon to be one of the three highest-paid quarterbacks in the NFL.
If Moon was not in the top three, the Oilers would have to pay
Moon the difference between his salary and the average of the
combined salaries of the top three.15' In 1991, Steinberg found it
was time to enforce the clause, as Sports Illustrated reported:
Steinberg knows that Dan Marino's contract [with the Miami
Dolphins], with its new five-year extension, comes to $4.43 mil-
lion per season and that Joe Montana has a contract [with the
144. See WALTER CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 22.3 (1990).
145. 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).





151. Peter King, To the Moon, Warren, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 9, 1991, at 62.
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San Francisco 49ers] that will pay him $3.25 million annually.
Steinberg also thinks John Elway has a new deal-which the
[Denver] Broncos have yet to disclose-that averages at least
$3.25 million a year. Even if he can't prove Elway has a new
contract, Steinberg still has Jim Kelly [of the Buffalo Bills], at
$2.86 million, to make his argument. The Marino-Montana-
Elway average annual intake is $3.64 million. Moon's pay for
1991 is $1.5 million. Bottom line, according to Steinberg: Hous-
ton owes Moon about $2.1 million. "It might be in the Oilers'
best interest just to do a new contract with Warren," Steinberg
says. 1
2
Arthur Rooney II called such a clause "a game of leapfrog,
' 153
and foresaw problems: "You may have fifteen players who have
that clause that say they have to be in the top five players."'
54
How would such a question be resolved? "I don't think it can
work, quite frankly," 15 5 said Rooney. "That particular type of
clause is one we try to stay away from.""'
B. Management Strategies
Hardball tactics have always been used by professional team
management people. Before the era of the agent, a simple refusal
to renegotiate or a withholding of pay during a holdout usually
sent a strong, and sometimes insurmountable, message.
The hired-gun element of sports agency, though, allowed ath-
letes to fight back more impersonally. So, with greater frequency
today, management hires specialists to deal with agents.157 "One
agent to negotiate with another," summarized a sports writer.
158
Not every team, though, employs a negotiation specialist.
Jerry Colangelo, who is not a lawyer, handles all the NBA's Phoe-
nix Suns' player negotiations, and always has. Colangelo says
eighty to ninety percent of NBA players negotiated their own con-
tracts when he started with the Suns at the age of twenty-eight. He
likes today's setting better.'59
"It was very uncomfortable dealing with a player because, be-
152. Id.




157. Richman, supra note 21.
158. Id.
159. Colangelo, supra note 53.
[Vol. 10:165
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ing an ex-athlete myself 160 and I wasn't that far removed age-wise,
. . . players were not equipped to deal with a player contract,"
161
remembered Colangelo. "I felt more comfortable dealing with
agents when they came into being." '162
1. Leverage
a. Pleading Poverty
The NBA's salary cap requires a team's payroll to be between
minimum and maximum totals.'63 Those negotiating NBA player
contracts must keep those restrictions in mind. Conversely, the
NFL is financially sound, but past league restrictions on player
movement have diminished players' leverage. 64 Some baseball
teams, though, appear to be justified in pleading poverty in re-
sponse to an athlete's demand for big money.
1 65
In 1990, Carl Barger, then the Pittsburgh Pirates general man-
ager, surveyed the possibility of his division championship team's
disintegration and said: "The way baseball is now, you almost can't
afford to win."1 66 Indeed, the Pirates were confronting free agency
and salary arbitration for many of their stars. 67 The Pirates, in
fact, told Bobby Bonilla that if they paid him his fair open-market
value, the team would go broke.61 8 Bonilla signed with the rival
New York Mets for $29 million."6 9
Pleading poverty is a tactic that does not seem to work. I
found no examples of players signing with a team for less than that
which they were seeking just because they were convinced of the
team's financial straits. In fact, athletes are usually unconvinced,
seeing attendance and general fan interest increase.
170
Outfielder Darryl Strawberry graciously accepted his team's
sentiments regarding player salaries. Still, those sentiments did not
influence Strawberry's choice of a team with which to sign. When
160. Colangelo played intercollegiate basketball at the University of Illinois.
161. Colangelo, supra note 53.
162. Id.
163. See Ashe, supra note 37, at F4.
164. See Steinberg, supra note 84, at 2.





169. Murray Chass, Tartabull Negotiations Centering on Angels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1991, sec. B, p. 21, col. 5.
170. Bobby Abrams, Take Me Out of the Ballgame, 16 J. BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N 163
(1982).
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his contract with the New York Mets was up, and the Mets did not
approach the other offers he received, Strawberry reacted this way:
"I don't think the front office was making an attempt to say,
'You're a big part of the club.' I think they believe their [contract]
policy is more important than any player."
171
Although Strawberry saw the Mets use a similar approach in
negotiations with pitcher Dwight Gooden, he says he understands
the team's strategy.1 72 "This is the way they chose it,' 73 said
Strawberry. "It was a great organization. I mean that. It was built
well.' 1 74 Strawberry signed with the Los Angeles Dodgers.
b. Outspending the Competition
The other side of the poverty coin, and a method that defi-
nitely nabs players, is simply to outspend the competition. Atlanta
Braves owner and communications magnate Ted Turner has been
a proponent of this method.'
75
Writer Murray Chass, quoting an anonymous New York Mets
official, described how Turner works: "Ted goes to the agent and
says tell me what you want. I'll give it to you. The agent works it
out and Turner says O.K..... When he decides he wants a guy,
the price is irrelevant.'
' 7
Other baseball team owners with reputations for free-spending
include George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees and Gene
Autry of the California Angels.
c. Hardball
Red Auerbach, the legendary general manager of the Boston
Celtics, used to do short television features on basketball skills en-
titled Red on RoundbaUi.'77 Not only does Auerbach know
"roundball," he knows hardball, too.
"Negotiating with Red is so hard because he starts off with a
figure, which he thinks is fair, and then he's hurt if you dare think
otherwise,' 78 said Bob Woolf. "And worse, for me, I always believe




175. Murray Chass, Yankees Meet With Winfield, Discuss Deal on His Charity Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1980, sec. 5, p. 51, col. b.
176. Id.
177. Red on Roundball aired at halftime of network NBA game telecasts during the
seventies.
178. Frank Deford, A Man For All Seasons, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 15, 1982, at 52.
[Vol. 10:165
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that he's completely sincere."1 9
Another NBA front-office negotiator with a reputation for
playing hardball is Andy Roeser of the Los Angeles Clippers. Roe-
ser once reportedly tried to give a player two season tickets instead
of the five-hundred dollars the player wanted. 80 "Negotiating with
Andy is like talking to a wall,"'18 claimed one agent who preferred
to remain anonymous. "He'll give you one figure and he won't
budge from that.' 8 2 Presumably, Auerbach and Roeser have coun-
terparts in other professional sports.
d. The Surroundings
Often, a key factor that convinces a player to sign is not the
money, but the team or the city in which it plays. For hockey leg-
end Gordie Howe, the chance to play alongside his two sons with
the now-defunct Houston Aeros motivated Howe to come out of
retirement in 1973 at the age of forty-five.
83
More typical is the reason second baseman Willie Randolph
gave for choosing a Los Angeles Dodgers offer over the Montreal
Expos: "I . . . liked the organization itself, the Dodgers' tradition
of winning. I wanted to be in a situation where I could win. "184
One who plays his team's winning tradition to the hilt is
Auerbach. "Red Auerbach is the most cunning negotiator of them
all," 85 conceded Howard Slusher, who told the story of one rookie
who was overcome by the Boston Celtic's tradition, as expounded
by Auerbach:
Auerbach [was] dangling a key chain with a Celtic emblem on it
in front of [Paul] Westphal. 'This is not just a keychain [sic],
this is the Celtics, this is Celtic tradition.' He didn't tell him
that you could buy one downstairs for $2.50. Paul almost be-
came the first kid to sign for a keychain [sic].' 8
Sometimes, when planning for a client, an agent will consider
the surroundings. Before the 1991 NFL draft, Leigh Steinberg
179. Id.
180. Chris Baker, Baylor Tries to Mold Clippers in His Image; But He May Have to




183. DAVIDSON, supra note 76, at 234-37.
184. Murray Chass, Randolph Finds a Job With Dodgers, N.Y. TIMES, sec. 8, p. 2, col.
2.
185. Richmond, supra note 12, at 17.
186. Id.
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called the Dallas Cowboys, trying to curtail the Cowboys' interest
in his client, Dan McGwire. 1 7 "I don't want Dan to sit behind a
young Pro Bowl quarterback,"' 88 explained Steinberg. "Instead, we
need to be on a team with an aging superstar, where he can
learn."'18 9 Perhaps the real reason Steinberg did not want McGwire
to play for Dallas was that its "young Pro Bowl quarterback" was
Troy Aikman, another Steinberg client.
During the seventies, athletes were attracted to New York be-
cause, for one thing, it is a media center. That attraction may now
be a thing of the past. In 1991, the Yankees asked Alan Meersand
about his client, third baseman Steve Buechele."'9 Meersand was
asked if Buechele has any aversion to New York, to which he re-
plied, "Doesn't everybody? I'm from the Bronx, and I have an
aversion to New York."1 91 Responded an anonymous Yankees offi-
cial, "It seems like every player nowadays has one thing in com-
mon, and that is that they don't want to play in New York.'
'1 92
e. Taking Advantage of Inexperience
With the multitude of agents that exists, team negotiators are
often looking at new faces across the table.'93 The opportunity is
there for an experienced general manager to take advantage of an
inexperienced agent.
"If it was a player that you didn't expect to make your team
[with an inexperienced agent], yeah, I'm sure you would try to sign
him for the least amount of money as you can,"' 94 admitted Denny
Thum. Thum warned, though, "If it's a first-round pick and he's
got a new representative that doesn't have any experience, it's
probably better to take the time with him and try to bring the guy
along so that he has confidence in you and his client has confi-
dence in you. '' 91
Gary Walker said the days are over of pulling the wool over
the rookie agent's eyes: "I think there's a basic integrity in every
187. Samantha Stevenson, N.F.L. Draft; As the Big Day Nears, It's the Agent Who
Does the Signal-Calling, N.Y. TIMES, sec. B, p. 5, col. 2.
188. Id.
189. Id.




193. Thum, supra note 101; Walker, supra note 107; Colangelo, supra note 53; Woods,
supra note 28.
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negotiation process . . . . We're trying to do what's best for every-
body and try to not have it [us] against them."' 196
2. Management-Favorable Terms
The following are management-favorable terms which teams
try to substitute for base salary. Players' agents would prefer es-
tablishing higher base salaries.
197
a. Incentive Bonuses
The professional sports industry needed a flexible means of
structuring contracts to pay athletes salaries that closely track per-
formance. Sports law responded with incentive bonuses. Gary
Walker said one of the biggest changes in athlete's contracts dur-
ing the era of the agent is that "there are all kinds of incentives,
where before there were very few, if any."'1 98 In 1992, Walker nego-
tiated a contract for pitcher Bob Walk with the Pittsburgh Pi-
rates.199 That contract provided Walk with bonuses for innings
pitched and pitching appearances. 00
When Reggie Jackson was with the California Angels, Walker
negotiated a deal in which Jackson would get an attendance bonus:
Jackson would collect fifty cents for every person in attendance
over the Angels' attendance the previous year.2 o0
In 1989, Eric Davis's Gold Glove Award 0 2 was transformed
into $100,000, thanks to an incentive clause in his contract. 03 A
1991 Associated Press survey revealed that thirty-three of the first
fifty-seven players named to baseball's All-Star Game received in-
centive bonuses ranging from $15,000 to $50,000.204
Running back Mike Rozier's 1990 contract with the Atlanta
Falcons was structured like this: on top of the base salary, Rozier
earned $30,000 for rushing for 200 yards, $30,000 for rushing for
400 yards, and $40,000 for reaching 600 yards. Rozier gained 675
196. Walker, supra note 107.
197. CHAMPION, supra note 144, at § 22.1.




202. The Gold Glove is awarded annually for fielding excellence.
203. Ben Henkey, Davis Turns Fielding Excellence Into Gold, THE SPORTING NEWS,
Dec. 11, 1989, at 49.
204. Bill Jauss, For Stars, It's Time for Bonus Round, CHI. TRaI., July 9, 1991, at 5
(Sports).
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yards, thus earning $100,000 in bonuses.205
Another new type of incentive clause in football pays a bonus
to the player for working out during the off-season. Such a clause
allows the team to require the player to work out in the team's
city, under the team's program.0 6
Agents must be alert when negotiating incentive clauses.
Pitcher Al Leiter's agent negotiated a $50,000 bonus if Leiter were
to win the Associated Press comeback-player-of-the-year award.
The Toronto Blue Jays agreed to the clause, knowing they would




Leigh Steinberg has made a name for himself by negotiating
donations to charities by teams on behalf of Steinberg's clients. 208
Along those lines, Jeff Irwin negotiated a contract for defensive
back Mark Carrier with the Chicago Bears that included a dona-
tion to Carrier's high school football program.2 09 Donations to
charity are but one of the perks for which an agent can bargain.
A sports law response to multinational taxation appears in the
contracts of some members of baseball's Montreal Expos. It is a
tax equalization clause, providing those players with extra money
to make up for the higher taxes in Canada.210 Similarly, agent Pe-
ter Johnson negotiated a $1.25 million bonus for football star Her-
schel Walker when Walker was traded from the Dallas Cowboys to
the Minnesota Vikings. The bonus was to replace money lost
through taxes (Texas lacks a state income tax), and
endorsements.' 11
Probably the two perks most commonly included in player
contracts are the roster bonus and the signing bonus. The player
205. Howard Balzer, NFL Makes Effort to Appease College Coaches, THE SPORTING
NEWS, Jan. 14, 1991, at 12.
206. Thum, supra note 101.
207. Jerry Crowe, Morning Briefing: Playgrounds Gave Hurley Winning Edge, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at C2, citing SPORTS ILLUSTRATED.
208. Thum, supra note 101.
209. Irwin, supra note 17.
210. Murray Chass et al., Expo Bonuses Help Lessen The Bite of Canadian Taxes,
THE SPORTING NEWS, June 19, 1989, at 74. The value difference between American and Ca-
nadian dollars is not an issue as all Expos and Toronto Blue Jay players are paid in Ameri-
can dollars. Interview with Danny J. Kaufer, Labor Lawyer with the firm of Heenan Blaikie,
Montreal, Canada, in Leesburg, Virginia (Mar. 26, 1993).
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must earn a spot on the team's regular season active roster to get
his roster bonus. 2 12 The signing bonus is paid for, simply, signing
the contract.213 Quarterback Troy Aikman's signing bonus from the
Dallas Cowboys, negotiated by Leigh Steinberg, was $1.6 million,
after taxes.214
Basketball player Bobby Gross once called upon Howard
Slusher to bargain for an unusual perk. Slusher was up to the task,
getting the Trail Blazers to pay for a membership for Gross in a
Portland country club.2"'
C. Both Sides of the Court
Donald Dell plays both sides of the court, enriching both. Dell
is a lawyer and a former tennis professional. Dell represents many
of tennis' biggest stars. He is also a former member of the Grand
Prix committee, which oversees tennis' major men's tournament
circuit, and Dell's firm directs five tournaments. It is no wonder
that Dell has been able to multiply greatly tournament prize
money.
216
There are many tools common to agents on both sides (or ei-
ther side) of the court. This section will discuss those tools.
1. Communication
"Information is power, '"217 summed up M.J. Duberstein, the
director of research for the NFL Players Association in 1987.
Negotiators on both sides have various ways of getting necessary
information.
Nineteen eighty-seven was an important year for the National
Football League Players Association (NFLPA), as salaries for draft
picks increased for the first time since 1984.218 According to Duber-
212. CHAMPION, supra note 144, at § 22.1.
213. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 4.
214. Elizabeth Comte, Inside a Quarterback's Checkbook: How the Money Comes In
and Goes Out, SPORT, June, 1990, at 90.
215. Richmond, supra note 12, at 17.
216. Raising The Net, FoRBEs, Dec. 1, 1975, at 39. In football, and presumably other
team sports, an arrangment similar to Dell's would be an impermissible conflict of interest.
Such an issue arose in the case of Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D.
Mich. 1984).
In Argovitz, the defendant represented a player, Billy Sims, and owned an interest in a
team, the Houston Gamblers of the USFL. Argovitz negotiated with the Gamblers on Sims'
behalf. The court held an agent to be a fiduciary, and thereby prohibited from self-dealing.
Id. at 547-48.
217. Sherman, supra note 83.
218. Id.
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stein, the increase was directly related to information: "We worked
very closely with agents and there was an intricate network ....
Agents who had a draftee would be able to keep in contact with all
other agents. That allowed them to be able to find out manage-
ment's line and sense different offers by round.
'219
For agents, information provided by the NFLPA is invaluable.
In 1991, law student Kevin Grenadier helped linebacker Pepper
Johnson prepare to negotiate his own contract with the New York
Giants. Grenadier got comparative salary information from the
NFLPA.22 °
On the other side of the court, baseball team owners operated
an information bank during the mid-eighties. The bank collected
information on offers teams made to free agents. When a team
asked about a player, the bank provided details of offers.2 21 The
bank was shut down, though, as it apparently violated anti-collu-




"Ultramodern negotiations "223 is how Leigh Steinberg de-
scribed his dealings with the Dallas Cowboys when negotiating
Troy Aikman's contract. For the final session, Steinberg and Aik-
man were in Thousand Oaks, California, while Cowboys owner
Jerry Jones was in Dallas. The sides talked via satellite
television.224
"We used to overnight things more . . . and now we fax [pro-
posals] back and forth so things can move a lot more swiftly,
'225
said Richard Woods of another example of the move toward high-
tech.
Still, the most-used negotiation conduit is far older than any
agent. "You can get . . . a lot done with the phone," contended
Gary Walker, "and then if you need to be there, then obviously,
you've got to be there. But I've found that the majority of negotia-
tions take place over a phone. "226
219. Id.
220. Frank Litzky, Football; Agent Johnson Reports for Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1991, Sec. B, p. 12, col. 1.
221. Hal Bodley, Free-agent Data Bank Scrapped, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 1989, at 4C.
222. Chass, Bidding in the Dark, supra note 69, at sec. 8, p. 6, col. 1.
223. He's Dialing for Dollars, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 7, 1989, at 18.
224. Id.
225. Woods, supra note 28.
226. Walker, supra note 107.
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III. CONCLUSION
Much has changed since the wide use of agents by athletes
began in the sixties. As sports law responds to contract law
problems in its own way, new negotiation devices and strategies
have emerged: comparative salaries, other offers, college ball and
the threat of arbitration. Some old strategies are still around
(hardball), and one old strategy may have all but disappeared (the
holdout). One new device seems to have already come and gone:
renegotiation.
Agents are now negotiating for creative, new terms, such as
salary tied to the market and incentive bonuses. The length of the
term of the contract is more readily negotiated. Management has
had to adapt to player's agents, and has sometimes done so by hir-
ing its own negotiation experts.
Preparation by both sides is critical. To become prepared,
communication with other negotiators is important. To communi-
cate with the other side, high-tech gear may be needed.
Forecasting the future evolution of athletes' contract negotia-
tions is difficult. It is certain, though, that the future of the sports
agency field depends on the success of the professional sports
industry.
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